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ETHICS AND CORRUPTION IN
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT: 
LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE





Ethics and Corruption in Business and Government:
Lessons from the South Sea Bubble 
and the Bank of the United States
Richard W. Painter*
This lecture addresses a phenomenon that arises repeatedly in history:
concurrent and interrelated corruption in the political system and in
business that puts political and business establishments on the defen-
sive.   When corruption from business spills over into government, the
story is likely to end with politicians seeking to cover for their own
actions or to elevate themselves on an ethical pedestal above their peers.
Resulting legislative action -- hostile to business and driven by self
serving political considerations in the wake of scandal -- is often not
well thought out, and may hinder economic growth and stability.
Today, I focus on two examples of this phenomenon in England
and the United States respectively.  First, the South Sea Bubble of 1720
- during which many Members of Parliament took bribes in South Sea
Company stock and traded in the stock on inside information - was fol-
lowed by Parliament's draconian restriction in the Bubble Act on trans-
ferability of shares for over 100 years thereafter.  Second, there were
two attempts at the end of the Eighteenth and the first half of the
Nineteenth Century to establish a permanent Bank of the United States
modeled on the Bank of England.  This undertaking was championed
by Federalist and Whig politicians who, while they may have sought
economic stability, also encouraged speculation in government securi-
ties on inside information, and bribery by the Bank of Members of
Congress.  The debate over the Bank was in part a debate over corrup-
tion that came with it.  The First Bank of the United States was opposed
and eventually allowed to expire by Jeffersonian Democrats and the
Second Bank was attacked, and then pushed out of business, by
* Associate Counsel to the President, The White House, and Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota Law School (on leave).
President Jackson.  Congress failed to establish a national bank until the
Wilson Administration in 1913, two and a quarter centuries after estab-
lishment of the Bank of England. 
I conclude that corruption of government by business is not only
bad for government, but in the long run bad for business.  Business
sometimes overreaches in influencing government officials, but at the
risk of a backlash in which politicians - in self righteous indignation or
in order to cover up for their own actions - embrace harsh anti-business
policies, regardless of whether those policies are in the national eco-
nomic interest.
Modern parallels do come to mind.  Some might think of Enron,
Worldcom and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   As a current White House
employee, I will not say more about these scandals beyond what I said
before I entered government service.
I reviewed former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's book in 2003.1
While I disagreed with some of Levitt's substantive views on securities
law, I shared his concern that accounting firms - including Arthur
Anderson while it audited Enron's books -- undermined the SEC's inde-
pendence by making an end run to Congress to complain about pro-
posed SEC rules.  Levitt pointed out that campaign contributions were
a significant part of the strategy.  
Enron and Worldcom embarrassed government and business.
There is considerable speculation about whether Congress overreacted.
If so, the Enron/Worldcom fiasco would fit into the broader phenome-
non I discuss in today.  Harsh legislative action follows political back-
lash when business exerts excessive influence on government.
Legislative action taken in an atmosphere of moral indignation does not
necessarily rid the political system or the economy of corruption, but
may leave a body of corporate law, or a banking system, or a capital
market that is weaker than what existed before.
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1 Standing Up to Wall Street, 101 Mich L Rev 1512 (2003) (reviewing Arthur
Levitt, Take on the Street (2002)).
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I. The South Sea Bubble
I turn first to the South Sea Bubble of 1720 and the disruption
of English corporate law that followed.  The South Sea Bubble is one
of the most famous financial crises in modern history and continues to
fascinate scholars of capital markets.2
Economic historians disagree over the extent to which investors
behaved rationally during the South Sea Bubble.  Irrationality has been
long been identified in the Bubble, most notably by Charles Mackay in
his 1841 book Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of
Crowds.   More recently, some economic historians - such as Gary
Shea3 -- argue that some investor behavior, and some pricing, was
rational during the South Sea Bubble. 
I sidestep this debate and focus instead on actions of govern-
ment officials who invested in the South Sea Company, who received
shares in the Company at favorable prices and often for little or no
money down, and who then participated in enacting legislation and
other official acts affecting the Company.4 Alexander Pope's verse
reflected widespread public disgust, not just with corruption in the
South Sea Company, but also disgust with a corrupted government:
At length corruption, like a general flood,
(So long by watchful Ministers withstood)
Shall deluge all, and avarice creeping on,
Spread, like a low-born mist, and blot the sun.
2 For a compilation of original sources on the Bubble, see John G. Sperling, The
South Sea Company:  An Historical Essay and Bibliographical Reading List (Baker
Library, Harvard Business School, 1962).
3 See Gary S. Shea, Rational Pricing of Options During the South Sea Bubble:
Valuing the 22 August 1720 Options (2004) (working paper). 
4 Part of this discussion is based on my earlier research.  See Richard W. Painter,
The South Sea Schemes of 1711 and 1720:  The Perpetrators and their Motives
(1984) (on file at Harvard University Archives, HU92.84.670) (Hollis Library
Catalogue No. 001156668).
Statesman and patriot ply alike the stocks,
Peeress and butler share alike the box;
And judges job, and bishops bite the town,
And mighty dukes pack cards for half-a-crown:
See Britain sunk in lucre's sordid charms
And France revenged of Anne's and Edward's arms!
--Alexander Pope (Epistle to Allen Lord Bathurst).
The scandal that inspired this verse emerged out of a plan to
refinance the national debt from England's frequent wars at the end of
the 17'th Century.  France was experimenting with its own plan to
finance debt from the wars of Louis XIV, fueling an "arms race" in
instruments of finance.  Both countries tried funding government debt
through private companies, with disastrous results for both.
France's scheme involved a trading company that, like
England's South Sea Company, had purported business operations so
distant that investors could not possibly monitor them.  In 1717, John
Law, a Scotsman of dubious reputation at home, acquired the
Mississippi Company, which the French government had given control
over trade in the Louisiana Territory and elsewhere.  Law also persuad-
ed the government to implement a banking scheme described in Law's
1705 treatise, Money and trade considered, with a proposal for supply-
ing the nation with money.  Law set up the Banque General, which
issued bank notes and dealt in shares of the Mississippi Company.  The
Banque General persuaded gullible investors to exchange outstanding
government debt for shares in the Company.  By 1719, speculative fren-
zy drove the price of the Company's shares up over 30 fold.  By May of
1720, the bubble burst, and Law fled France.  The experience left the
French distrustful of national banks with power to issue paper money.
Not until 1800  - when Napoleon needed money for his wars -- was the
Banque de France finally established, over one hundred years after the
Bank of England.  
The Bank of England was founded in 1694 by prominent Whig
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financiers - under the guidance of another Scotsman, William Paterson
-- in order to act as the government's banker.  Paterson proposed a loan
of £1.2 million from the Bank's subscribers to the government in return
for the receipt of a Royal Charter which bestowed banking privileges
including issuance of notes.  The interest rate on the loan was a high 8%
per year plus a service charge of several thousand pounds per year.
Unlike Law's bank in France, however, the Bank of England was not
tied to a trading company or another glamorous business that could fuel
speculation in its own securities.
In 1711, Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, sought to establish a
Tory alternative to the Bank.  He enlisted a group of Tory financiers
including John Blunt, Elias Turner, Jacob Sawbridge, and George
Caswall.   These men had all stood for election as Tory candidates to the
board of directors of the Bank of England or the East India Company,
and had lost to Whigs.  Of modest background, they were Tories out of
convenience more than conviction; the Whig financial establishment
wanted to have little to do with them.  In 1700 they had obtained con-
trol of another company, the Sword Blade Company, and diverted it
from manufacturing sword blades to acting as the government's banker
under Tory Administrations.5 Now they sought, with Harley's blessing,
to establish a bigger Tory rival to the Bank of England that would
engage in a more glamorous business than manufacturing sword blades.
This business - perhaps the ‘.com’ equivalent of the day -- was trade
with vast territories in the Caribbean and Latin America that Spain
could no longer militarily defend as its own monopoly.
The South Sea Company in 1711 received from the English
government a monopoly on English trade with Spain's South American
territories.    In return, the Company agreed to assume a significant por-
tion  -- approximately £9.5 million -- of floating army and navy debt at
a rate of 6% per year, a discount over then prevailing interest rates.  The
value of the South Sea trade was supposed to make up the difference.
5 For discussion of these men's exploits see John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble
at 32-35 (1960); Sperling, The South Sea Company at 5 (cited in note 2); and
Painter, The South Sea Schemes at 9 (cited in note 4).
Subscribers to the Company's stock provided the needed capital, and
some of these shareholders were government annuity holders who
exchanged their government obligations for Company stock.  Although
the shareholders would eventually elect the Company's directors, the
initial slate of directors was chosen by the Queen, and hence by Harley.
Harley also made himself Governor of the Company.6
The trade concession was of modest value.  King Philip V of
Spain limited the Company to one shipment of merchandise each year
to South America.  In the treaty negotiations leading up to the 1713
Peace of Utrecht, Philip would yield little more to England.  England's
Tory ministers never liked England's wars on the Continent - and the
enormous cost of these wars - and would not sacrifice peace in order to
extract trade concessions from Spain.  
What followed was a pattern of widespread deception from
1711 through 1720.  In secret peace negotiations with Spain, Harley's
government obtained almost nothing of value by way of trade conces-
sions, a fact never revealed to the Company's directors and sharehold-
ers who continued to be told how lucrative trade would be.  The
Government also had no moral reservations about using public funds to
pay journalists - most prominently Daniel Defoe7 - to write wildly opti-
mistic and bellicose pamphlets promoting the Company and England's
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6 Painter, The South Sea Schemes at 6-13 (cited in note 4) (describing formation of
the South Sea Company) and Appendix II (listing its directors in 1711).  See
Carswell, The South Sea Bubble at 58 (cited in note 5) (pointing out that the direc-
tors "[a]part from their stock, had only one thing in common.  Not a single one of
them had any experience of the South American, or even the West Indian trade ...”).
7 See Daniel Defoe, A True Account of the Design and Advantages of the South Sea
Trade (London, 1711) (printed for J. Morphew) ("It will open such a vein of rich-
es, will return such wealth, as, in a few years, will make us more than sufficient
amends for the vast expenses we have been at since the [1688] Revolution.")   See
also An Essay on the South Sea Trade (London, 1712) (Printed for J. Baker and
attributed to Daniel Defoe); The True State of the Case between the Government
and the Creditors of the Navy as it Relates to the South Sea Trade (London, 1711)
(Printed for J. Baker and attributed to Daniel Defoe).  Copies of these pamphlets
are available in Kress Library, Harvard Business School (other pamphlets in this
collection hereinafter designated with a "K"). 
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prospects for encroaching on Spanish commerce in the South Seas.   In
reality, there was no such luck - the first annual voyage was not made
until 1717, and trade was interrupted the following year because of a
disagreement with Spain.  Meanwhile, the Company's directors were
engaged in self dealing at the expense of shareholders by dispatching
Company ships and crew on private "off the books" trading missions,
profits from which were paid into directors pockets.8
Things got worse when George I succeeded Queen Anne, who
had been a Tory sympathizer, and the Whigs came to power.  Two of the
Company's founders and political supporters, Harley and Lord
Bolingbroke, were charged with treason.  Suggesting some efficiency in
stock markets at the time, South Sea Company stock - despite all the
hype coming from Defoe and others - continued its mediocre perform-
ance and was trading well below par as late as 1719. 
Perhaps in order to deal with difficulties in a Whig dominated
political environment, the Company turned to a strategy of selling stock
to politicians, and eventually to bribery.  The Company avoided trouble
with the Crown by approaching the King's two Hanoverian mistresses,
Madam Schulenburg and Madam Kielmansegge, each of whom was
given shares in the Company (it is unknown whether the Queen
received similar benefits).  The Company issued shares, sometimes for
little or no cash down, to senior government officials, including John
Aislabie, Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Craggs, Postmaster, and
Charles Stanhope, Secretary of the Treasury.  The Company may have
been founded by Tories, but enough Whigs could be bought so that
business could go on.
The Company's principal business would not be trade in the
South Seas, but instead a greatly expanded program of meeting the gov-
ernment's debt restructuring needs when interest rates declined after the
8 At least one prominent shareholder publicly complained about these trading mis-
sions using Company ships and crew.  See Some Considerations Relating to the
Management of the Affairs of the South Sea Company (London, 1716)  (printed by
J. Morphew) (K) (the anonymous author complained that he made a large invest-
ment in the Company only to see profits siphoned off by its directors).
Peace of 1713.  The government in wartime had been unwise to borrow
large sums over a long term at fixed rates of interest ranging from seven
to nine percent.  Parliament now sought ways to redeem and refinance
this high-interest debt by persuading a large number of government
bond holders to give up what had been a fabulous investment.  The gov-
ernment had every motive to allow investors to be deceived in order to
accomplish this task.9
The King's speech opening Parliament in 1717 referred to the
continuing need to finance the debt.  By early 1720, it was proposed that
the South Company assume almost all of the government debt, offering
stock in exchange for government bonds.  This fed further speculation
in the shares and the price finally began to rise.  Some of the specula-
tors were MPs or members of the Administration, trading on inside
information about the role that Parliament would assign to the
Company in refinancing the national debt.
In January 1720, the Commons began considering competing
proposals from the South Sea Company and the Bank of England to
finance the remainder of the national debt, about 31 million pounds.
Both companies offered to assume this debt for seven years, through
1727, in return for interest at five per cent.   In order to compete with
the Bank, the South Sea Company agreed that the government could
redeem the debt after four years, instead of seven, if rates continued to
fall. The Bank matched this proposal.  Robert Walpole, First Earl of
Oxford, was the main advocate in Parliament for the Bank, and Mr.
Aislabie, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the main advocate for the
South Sea Company.  One key difference between the proposals was
8 qÜÉj~ìêáÅÉ~åÇjìêáÉäcìäíçåiÉÅíìêÉpÉêáÉë
9 There were some honest proposals, but these would have cost the government
more money.  Archibald Hutcheson, M.P. for Hastings on Sussex, observed that the
government had put itself in a bind by selling ninety-nine year irredeemable annu-
ities in order to borrow during wartime, and he proposed that this debt be gradual-
ly retired by expanding the government's sinking fund.  Some Calculations and
Remarks Relating to the Present State of the Public Debts and Funds and a
Proposal for the Entire Discharge of the National Debt and Incumbrance in Thirty
Years Time (London, 1718) (printed for Henry Clements and attributed to
Archibald Hutcheson) (K).   
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that the exchange ratio of Bank of England shares for government debt
was fixed, being tied to the par value of Bank stock.  The South Sea
Company's proposal was instead tied to market value; the higher the
market value of Company stock the more government debt would be
redeemed in exchange for a share of stock.10 The House of Commons
chose the proposal of the South Sea Company, in part because the
Company's faction had more political pull and in part because the
Company, without the par value provision, could offer the nominally
higher price and redeem more debt, provided its stock continued to rise.
When the proposal went to the House of Lords, there were only seven-
teen peers against the scheme, and eighty-three in favor.
Many MPs and Lords had invested in South Sea Company
stock and then voted on bills to extend the Company's monopoly on
South Sea trade.  Now they voted again on the Company's proposal to
fund the national debt.  The Company meanwhile accelerated its pro-
gram of bribing MPs and other officials by selling them stock for little
or no money down.  Robert Knight, the Company's Treasurer, kept a
record of these transactions in a green book, but many of these "sales"
were never transferred to the Company's official records, and when
scandal broke neither the green book nor Knight were ever seen again.11
As speculation in the Company's stock grew, others prominent
Londoners climbed on the bandwagon, including Jonathan Swift, John
Gay, Issac Newton and Thomas Guy.  At its peak, the South Sea
Company's market capitalization was over 150 million pounds, about
ten times the value of the national debt and other assets then held by the
Company.
Then came the Bubble Act of 1720.  The Act was not as much
a reaction to the Bubble as part of an effort to keep the Bubble afloat by
10 South Sea company partisans rejected suggestions that the Company should
adopt the Bank's approach of fixing the exchange ratio.  See An Argument to Show
the Disadvantage that Would Accrue to the Public From Obliging the South Sea
Company to fix what Capital Stock they Will Give for the Annuities (London, 1720)
(printed for J. Roberts and attributed to Daniel Defoe) (K).
11 See Painter, The South Sea Schemes at 79-92 (cited in note 4) (detailing the
stock "sales" by Mr. Knight to politicians).  
stifling competition from hundreds of other copy-cat joint stock com-
pany schemes, many boasting of other nonexistent or grossly exagger-
ated ventures.   Some were actually called Bubbles.  Some lasted for
weeks, some for less than that.  Many involved leading aristocrats.  
On June 11, 1720 the King proclaimed these projects a public
nuisance that should be prosecuted.  On July 12, the Lord Justices in
privy council published an order "taking into consideration the many
inconveniences arising to the public from several projects set on foot for
raising of joint stock for various purposes."   This same order dismissed
a large number of petitions for patents and charters, and dissolved over
80 bubble companies established for various purposes, including one
"for drying malt by hot air."12
Parliament soon thereafter passed the Bubble Act.13 The pre-
amble of the Act claimed its objective to be protecting investors from
"fraud traps."  The Act prohibited formation of joint stock companies or
other partnerships with freely transferable shares.  This left only two
ways to form such a company - a Crown charter or a charter granted by
separate statute, both of which were extraordinarily difficult to obtain.
The Bubble Act was not repealed until 1825.
The Bubble Act thus proclaimed that there should be no bubbles
but those bubbles officially sanctioned by Parliament.  The South Sea
Company, formed by statute, would survive the Bubble Act, but now
without competitors for investors' capital.  Members of Parliament
would also have similar advantages - including manipulating markets
by passing legislation and trading on inside information - if they invest-
ed in future Bubbles that were creatures of statute.   The Bubble Act thus
arguably was motivated by rent seeking for Members of Parliament
more than concern for investor protection.14
The Bubble Act was also political cover.  MPs, themselves part
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12 See Charles Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of
Crowds at 52 (1841)
13 1720, 6 Geo 1, ch 18 (Eng.).
14 See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16 J Legal Stud 101 (1987) (arguing that government offi-
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of the South Sea Company craze, probably wanted to show that they
were doing something to protect investors from Bubbles in general, if
not from this particular Bubble.  The ruinous Mississippi Bubble in
France gave Parliament ample grounds to denounce bubbles, and at the
same time distance MPs from an impending South Sea Bubble scandal
that was their own making.  Parliament could continue to inflate one
bubble while proclaiming that there should be no more bubbles.  
In any event, the Bubble Act did not shore up the price of South
Sea Company stock, and indeed may have precipitated its collapse.15
Joint stock companies banned by the Act had to wind up, and many
demanded that shareholders pay money still owing for purchase of
shares.  These shareholders in turn raised cash by selling other assets,
including shares in the South Sea Company.  The price of South Sea
Company stock then collapsed in September 1720, causing bank fail-
ures and collapse of other stock prices.  
Parliament responded with self righteous indignation.  The
House of Lords on January 26, 1721 resolved that giving credit for
South Sea stock without consideration; or the purchase of stock by the
Company for a Member of the Administration or of Parliament, while
the South Sea Bill pending, was an act of corruption.16 Another reso-
lution condemned for fraud and breach of trust those directors and offi-
cers of the Company who had secretly sold their own stock.  The House
of Commons passed resolutions condemning stockjobbers, and target-
ed both the Company's officers and directors and even some of their
own Members with investigations.17
South Sea Company directors were ordered to give a full
cials create rent-seeking opportunities for themselves by enacting and threatening
regulation, and that extensive regulation promotes corruption by encouraging pri-
vate actors to seek favors from government officials).
15 See generally, Larry Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous L Rev 77 (2003) (dis-
cussing the Bubble Act).
16 The History and Proceedings of the House of Lords from the Restoration in 1660
to the Present Times, Vol. VI at 135 (London, 1742) (printed for Ebenezer
Timberland). 
17 Several reports were printed on the investigation.  See A Supplement to the
account of their conduct.  In keeping with a tradition extending to more
recent times, evidence was destroyed and accounting records altered to
conceal wrongdoing.  Company books produced before Parliament
contained fictitious entries; some entries stated amounts paid for shares,
but left blanks for names of purchasers.  Erasures appeared in some
places, alterations in others, and pages were torn out.  A royal procla-
mation offered a reward for the apprehension of Knight, the Treasurer
of the Company, who fled to Calais with his green book recording stock
sales to political insiders, but he was never brought back to England for
questioning.18 Sir John Blunt was called before both the Commons and
the Lords to answer questions, including about sales of stock to mem-
bers of the Administration and Members of Parliament, most of which
he refused to answer.  
The House of Lords ordered an investigation of Mr. Aislabie,
Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was forced to resign, and of Mr.
Craggs, another member of the ministry.  Several Members of the
House of Commons were expelled, including Sir Theodore Janssen, Mr.
Sawbridge, Sir Robert Chaplin and Mr. Eyles.  Mr. Aislabie was com-
mitted to the Tower for a year.19  The Earl of Sunderland was eventual-
ly acquitted by a vote of 233 to 172.  Daniel Defoe quickly distanced
himself from the scandal by denouncing these politicians and support-
ing Parliament's right to pass a bill of attainder against them.20 Over
two million pounds was also confiscated from the estates of the South
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Reports of the Committee of Secrecy (London, 1721) (printed for A. Moore) (K);
An Abstract of the Supplement to the Reports of the Committee of Secrecy (London,
1721) (printed for J. Lapworth) (K).
18 Sperling, The South Sea Company at 3 (cited in note 2).  
19 According to a contemporary political pamphlet, the Committee of Secrecy "dis-
covered great dealings in South Sea stock by John Aislabie Esq. with one broker,
Nathaniel Wymonfold, whilst the South Sea scheme and the Bill were depending
in Parliament, and soon after the Bill passed." The Skreen Removed in a List of the
Names Mentioned in the Report of the Committee of Secrecy at 13 (London, 1721)
(printed for J. Lapworth) (K).
20 A Vindication of the Honour and Justice of Parliament Against a Most
Scandalous Libel Entitled: "The Speech of John Aislable, Esq." (London, 1721)
(printed for A. Moore and attributed to Daniel Defoe) (K).
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Sea directors, each only being allowed to retain a relatively small por-
tion, depending on the proportion of the harm attributed to him.21
One of the most curious actors in this drama was the Whig
politician Robert Walpole who used the scandal to advance his career.
Walpole entered Parliament in 1701 and later became Secretary of War
and Treasurer of the Navy.  The Tories, led by Robert Harley and
Viscount Bollingbrook, then regained power and sought Walpole's
downfall in 1712.  In a politically motivated prosecution Walpole was
impeached by the Commons and convicted by the Lords for accepting
illegal payments while he was Secretary of War.  He spent six months
in the Tower.  His constituents, however, reelected him in 1713.  When
the Whigs came back to power in 1714, Walpole headed a
Parliamentary committee of secrecy investigating corruption in the
prior Tory ministry, leading to impeachment of Oxford and
Bollingbrook for treason (impeachment was a staple of politics in the
rivalry between Whigs and Tories).  
Walpole spoke out against the South Sea scheme in the House
of Commons.   He warned that "the dangerous practice of stockjobbing
would divert the genius of the nation from trade and industry."  He was
ignored.  Ironically, Walpole joined the speculative frenzy and invested
in, and lost money in, South Sea Company stock.  He did, however, get
out sooner than many investors (he apparently was warned by his
banker to sell his stock, although he also had an inside view of
Parliament's own involvement with the Company).  
Lords Stanhope and Sunderland, Walpole's chief Whig rivals,
were both implicated in the scandal, clearing his rise to power.  Walpole
devised a plan for the Bank of England and the East India Company to
bail out the South Sea Company.   Eventually, the Company had to be
21 Sir John Blunt, Sir John Fellows, Sir Theodore Janssen, Mr. Edward Gibbon, and
Sir John Lambert lost the most.  Blunt, who had been so reticent to answer ques-
tions from Parliament, did years later set forth his version of what had happened.
See John Blunt, True state of the South-Sea-scheme, as it was first formed, &c.:
with the several alterations made in it before the act of Parliament passed: and an
examination of the conduct of the directors in the execution of that act (London:
Printed and sold by J. Peele, 1732).
completely restructured.  Over eight million pounds was taken from the
Company, and given to the stockholders.  Persons who had borrowed
money from the Company against their stock were forgiven all but ten
percent of their debt to the Company (subscription agreements were
thus considered as if they had been options-to-buy, which arguably had
been the intent to begin with).22 Walpole became Prime Minister in
1721 and served until 1742.  He probably was not personally corrupt,
but he had a reputation for tolerating bribery and corruption in his
Administration.23
In addition to Walpole's long tenure as Prime Minister, the lega-
cy of the South Sea Bubble was the Bubble Act, which shaped English
corporate law for over a century.  The Bubble Act, and continued hos-
tility to joint stock companies in Parliament and sometimes in the judi-
ciary made raising capital more complicated, if not more difficult.
The Act was not vigorously enforced for much of the 18th
Century.24 Prevailing legal opinion, was that the Act was violated only
if there were no restrictions on transfer of shares.  Thus, companies con-
tinued to be formed, but shares were in some respects not freely trans-
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22 Making subscribers pay would have been difficult.  See Armand Dubois, The
English Business Company after the Bubble Act, The Coercion of Defaulters 367-
9 (1938) (describing legal and practical difficulties with making defaulters pay on
subscription agreements).  Subscription shares thus arguably were options to buy
shares, and were priced as such.  See Gary Shea, Financial Market Analysis Can
Go Mad (in the Search for Irrational Behaviour During the South Sea Bubble)
(July 2005) (Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis Working Paper No.
0508 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=779025)  (attributing price dif-
ferences between subscription shares and original shares to difficulties the
Company would have collecting subscription payments if the stock price declined),
responding to Richard Dale, Johnnie V. Johnson, and Leilei Tang, Financial
Markets Can Go Mad:  Evidence of Irrational Behavior during the South Sea
Bubble,  58 Econ Hist Rev 233 (May 2005) (arguing that subscription shares were
overpriced by the market).
23 Alexander Pope and other writers criticized, among other things. Walpole's
excessive use of patronage to secure political power.   See Alexander Pope,
Imitations of Horace (1738). 
24 See Larry Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-in?, Illinois Law and
Economics Working Paper Series at 14 (2006) (posted on SSRN); Edward H.
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ferable.  Lawyers sought ways around the Act, whether by creating
trusts to manage businesses or creating partnerships with insignificant
formal restrictions on transferability.  London solicitors built up a prac-
tice based on interpreting the Act, and transaction costs rose.  In the
early nineteenth century, however, enforcement picked up with a num-
ber of judicial rulings between 1808 and 1812.  The Act was formally
repealed in 1825, although the legal landscape for incorporation
remained uncertain because some judges insisted that common law
imposed similar prohibitions.25 
Thus, despite extraordinary economic change during the
Industrial Revolution, the legal framework of business organization in
England was highly restrictive for a century and a quarter.  Other coun-
tries with far less developed economies had more permissive laws of
business organization.26 Change did not come until sweeping reforms
- including freedom of incorporation by registration -- in the General
Incorporation Act of 1844.   Limited liability did not get full legal sanc-
tion until the Limited Liability Act of 1855.   As Ron Harris observes,
a dynamic industrial economy still evolved within this static legal
framework.  This may be due to lack of enforcement of the Bubble Act
and to lawyers' creative navigation around it.  Nonetheless, economic
growth might have been even greater if Parliament and the judiciary had
Bubble Act had a positive effect on private ordering by encouraging experimenta-
tion with alternatives to joint stock companies, such as partnerships. 
25 See Duvergier v Fellows, 5 Bing. 248 Bext, c. 5 (1828) ("The scheme in which
the parties to this action were engaged was one of those bubbles by which, to the
disgrace of the present age, a few projectors have obtained the money of a great
number of ignorant and credulous persons, to the ruin of those dupes and their fam-
ilies . . . Although the statute of 6 Geo. 1 [the Bubble Act] be repealed, the com-
mon law relating to such schemes is expressly reserved by the repealing statute;
and no one doubts, if it can be shewn, and it easily may, that such schemes are
fraud-traps and injurious to the public welfare, that the forming of them is an
indictable offense at common law.").
26 See Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law:  Entrepreneurship and Business
Organization, 1720-1844 (2000).  See also Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-
in? at 14 (cited in note 24); Warren, Corporate Advantages at 333 (cited in note 24)
(noting that Bubble Act restrictions on transferability of shares were not part of the
United States legal system at the time).
not obstructed utilization of the joint stock company.  The Bubble Act
restrictions were certainly a very blunt instrument with which to com-
bat excess financial speculation.
II. The First and Second Banks of the United States   
The history of political hostility to banks in the United States
has been discussed extensively by scholars.  Mark Roe, for example
observes that populist fears of concentrated economic power, interest
group maneuvering, and a federalist American political structure all had
a role in pressuring Congress to fragment U.S. financial institutions.27
The history of the Bank of the United States is part of this story, and cor-
ruption by the Bank of the political system had its role in fostering hos-
tility to the idea of a national bank.
Assumption and Speculation
Like the Bank of England, the First Bank of the United States
began with a scheme to refinance the national debt, in this case the
Revolutionary War debt of the Continental government and the various
states.  Speculators had bought up much of this debt for fractions of par
value; some of the certificates and notes made their way into the hands
of members of Congress and their allies.  Any proposal to pay off the
debt in its entirety would be seen as an unjustified reward for specula-
tors who had political connections.  
In 1781, Robert Morris, as Superintendent of Finance, issued a
Report on Public Credit proposing that the Confederation government
assume the states' Revolutionary War debt, issue bonds, impose import
duties to finance payments, and establish a national bank.   
The Constitution, ratified in 1788, gave Congress power to
impose tariffs and collect taxes.   Alexander Hamilton - Secretary of the
Treasury from 1789 to 1795 -- and other Federalists wanted an eco-
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27 See Mark J. Roe, The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, 9 J of
Applied Corp Fin 8 (Winter 1997). 
bíÜáÅë~åÇ`çêêìéíáçåáå_ìëáåÉëë~åÇdçîÉêåãÉåí 17
nomic system that would include a judiciary, enforcement of contracts,
payment in full of obligations including public debt, and promotion of
manufacturing.  Hamilton's economic model looked to England, which
had established the Bank of England in 1696 and taxed spirits to fund
the national debt.  The anti-Federalists or Republican-Democrats were
deeply suspicious of Hamilton's economic program, particularly to the
extent it gave taxation and other powers to the federal government.
They also disliked the idea of a Bank.28
Hamilton, in his Report on Public Credit of January 1790 pro-
posed that Congress redeem at full par value the debt of the Continental
government.  Old Continental government certificates (totaling about
$50 million) would be exchanged for new government bonds with
maturities of up to 30 years yielding 4 percent to 6 percent.  Hamilton
also proposed that the federal government assume the Revolutionary
War obligations of the states.  Interest on the federal debt was to be paid
with customs duties and excise taxes.29 
This proposal would give a windfall to speculators who bought
up debt of the Confederation at a portion of its face value from desper-
ate sellers - farmers, small businessmen and Revolutionary War veter-
ans who had received the certificates in lieu of soldiers' pay.  Thomas
Jefferson and Hamilton's other critics envisioned not only speculation
but corruption.  
Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania, for example, accused
other Members of Congress of speculating on inside information about
Congress's intention of paying off the debt in full.  
In his Journal, Maclay wrote on January 15, 1790:
"I call not at a single house or go into any company
but traces of speculation in certificates appear.  Mr.
28 See generally Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (2004).
29 See generally id at 225; Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of
Federalism at 112-21 (1993). 
Langdon,30 the old and intimate friend of Mr. Morris,31
lodges with Mr. Hazard.32 Mr. Hazard has followed
buying certificates for some time past.  He told me he
had made a business of it; it is easy to guess for whom.
I told him, 'You are, then, among the happy few who
have been let into the secret.'  He seemed abashed, and
I checked by my forwardness much more information,
which he seemed disposed to give."
"The Speaker gives me this day his opinion, that Mr.
Fitzsimons33 was concerned in this business as well as
Mr. Morris, and that they stayed away [from Congress]
for the double purpose of pursuing their speculation and
remaining unsuspected."34
Again, on January 18, Maclay wrote:
"[Senator] Hawkins of North Carolina said as he came
up he passed two expresses with very large sums of
money on their way to North Carolina for purposes of
speculation in certificates.  Wadsworth35 has sent off
two small vessels for the Southern States, on the errand
of buying up certificates.  I really fear the members of
Congress are deeper in this business than any others.
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30 John Langdon, Senator from New Hampshire.
31Robert Morris, Senator from Pennsylvania.  As Superintendent of Finance for the
Continental government, Morris had proposed redeeming the Revolutionary War
debt at par value.
32 Jonathan J. Hazard, Rhode Island's Delegate to the Continental Congress in
1788.
33 Thomas Fitzsimons, Congressman from Pennsylvania.
34 Journal of William Maclay, United States Senator from Pennsylvania 1789-1791
at 173-74 (Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1965) (1890).
35 Jeremiah Wadsworth, Congressman from Connecticut.
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Nobody doubts but all commotion originated from the
Treasury. . . "36
Speculators pumped Members of Congress and the
Administration for details about Hamilton's plan and its chances for
adoption (Federal Hall was conveniently located near Wall Street in
New York).  How much Hamilton and his associates leaked inside
information to friends who in turn traded is still a subject of debate.
One economic historian observes that "the evidentiary record points
toward the conclusion that the first market for government securities
was created by interested parties with special information."37
Meanwhile, Congressman James Madison, a Democrat, sug-
gested a compromise of paying the speculators the highest market price
to date for the certificates with the balance going to the original note
holders.  Hamilton countered that such "discrimination" in favor of the
original debt holders was unworkable, and that the certificates were
negotiable, creating a moral obligation to pay the holder in full.  He had
the votes and Congress passed his plan to pay the certificate holders the
entirety of the debt.   
There was even more resistance to Hamilton's plan for federal
assumption of state debts of about $25 million, but Hamilton struck a
deal with Madison, Jefferson and other Virginians under which the
Virginians would support assumption of state debts, and the
Administration would support moving the capitol to a location on the
Potomac River.   The assumption proposal was thus approved, much to
the dismay of some anti-federalists.  Maclay lamented in his Journal on
July 17th:  "[T]he assumption was forced on us to favor the views of
speculation. . . . The whole town almost has been busy at it; and, of
course, all engaged in influencing the measures of Congress.  Nor have
the Members of Congress kept their hands clean of this dirty work; from
Wadsworth, with his boat-load of money, down to the daily six dollars,
36 Maclay, Journal at 174-75 (cited in note 34).
37 Howard M. Wachtel, Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of Wall Street, Report-
no: HW-02-101096. Available at SSRN.
20 qÜÉj~ìêáÅÉ~åÇjìêáÉäcìäíçåiÉÅíìêÉpÉêáÉë
have they generally been at it."38
Congress, when it created the office of the Secretary of the
Treasury in 1789 ironically told Hamilton that it would not stand for his
own involvement with speculating in federal or state debt.  Congress
provided that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer may not
"be concerned with buying or disposing of obligations of a State or the
United States Government" while in office and that an officer who vio-
lates this provision "shall be fined $3,000, removed from office, and
thereafter may not hold an office in the Government.39 The provision
was intended to prevent high ranking Treasury officials from "speculat-
ing in the public funds."40 The First Congress, however, said nothing
about the fact that Members of Congress were themselves speculating
in the public funds.
The First Bank
Hamilton sought to conduct national finances through a nation-
al Bank modeled on the Bank of England.  The Bank would be char-
tered for twenty years and have capital stock not to exceed $10 million:
$8 million from private investors and $2 million from the federal gov-
ernment.  The government would own one-fifth and private investors
four-fifths of the Bank's stock.  Private investors could pay for three-
fourths of their purchased stock in public debt certificates.  The Bank
would have power to issue negotiable notes that would circulate.
Maclay and the other anti-federalists complained that the argument in
favor of the Bank "resolved itself into this: that the public should find
the specie to support the bank while the speculators, who subscribe [for
bank stock] almost wholly in certificates, receive the profits of the div-
idends."41 Congress nonetheless passed the bill establishing the Bank
38 Maclay, Journal at 323 (cited in note 34).  Six dollars was the daily pay of a
Member of Congress.
39 1 Stat 65, 67 (1789), codified in 31 USC § 329 (2000).
40 See 1 Annals of Congress 636 (1789) (statement of the bill sponsor,
Representative Aedanus Burke).
41 Maclay, Journal at 361 (cited in note 34).
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in February 1791, and the First Bank of the United States received its
charter.  
It is debated whether, at least in its early years, the Bank helped
stabilize the financial system.  The initial stock offering for the Bank in
July 1791 sparked speculative frenzy.  Investors quickly bought $8 mil-
lion in the Bank's stock, with Members of Congress among the pur-
chasers.  The stock price rose sharply and then fell sharply.  In 1792,
trading in new Treasury bonds fueled growth of a securities market near
Federal Hall and brokers met to organize what became the New York
Stock Exchange.  Insider trading in the newly issued government bonds
continued.  William Duer used his connections with Hamilton to spec-
ulate in government bonds, but went bankrupt and helped precipitate a
market crash in 1792.  The Bank was hardly effective in controlling this
speculation and ensuing panic.42
Hamilton's financial plan - and the establishment of the Bank -
was also tied to a very unpopular idea:  raising taxes.  Hamilton's 1791
Report on Manufactures suggested protective tariffs.  Congress raised
tariffs on imports and imposed a tax on distillers.  In Western
Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the distillers' tax was a threat to farmers
who used spirits as currency as well as drink.  Some refused to pay.   In
1794, a federal court ordered distillers to pay the tax, provoking the
Whisky Rebellion.  President Washington called in militia to put down
the rioting.  
The battle over Hamilton's economic plan thus pitched Northern
commercial interests and speculators in depreciated federal and state
debt against Southerners and farmers who believed the plan would
enrich these vested interests at their expense.  Banks were also by their
nature suspect  -- particularly a national bank modeled on the Bank of
42 See generally Richard Sylla, William Duer and the Stock Market Crash of 1792,
Friends of Financial History, No. 46 (1992); Robert E. Wright and David J. Cowen,
Financial Founding Fathers: The Men Who Made America Rich (2006); David J.
Cowen, The Origins and Economic Impact of the First Bank of the United States,
1791-1797 (2000) (blaming a sharp curtailment of credit by the Bank for the panic
of 1792); David J. Cowen, The First Bank of the United States and the Securities
Market Crash of 1792, 60 J of Econ Hist 1041 (2000).
England.  
Thomas Jefferson was among those hostile to Hamilton's eco-
nomic plan and to the Bank, the establishment of which he believed
exceeded federal powers.  When he became President in 1801, Jefferson
abolished many of Hamilton's taxes, including the whisky tax, but he
allowed the Bank to remain intact, in part to appease Federalists in
Congress.  After Jefferson left office in 1809 he continued his opposi-
tion to the Bank.  
When the Bank's charter came before Congress for renewal in
1811, the Democrat-Republican party controlled Congress.  Many state
banks opposed renewal of the Bank's charter because they believed the
Bank had unfair advantages.  The House of Representatives defeated
the re-charter bill by one vote. 
The First Bank thus folded in 1811 when its charter expired.
Merchant and financier Stephen Girard purchased most of the Bank's
stock as well as the Bank's building in Philadelphia and founded the
Bank of Stephen Girard, which loaned money to the government during
the War of 1812 (Girard subscribed to 95% of the government's war
loan of about $5 million).  Thus began an American tradition of private
financiers substituting for a national bank in times of financial emer-
gency.
The Second Bank
The financial impact of the War of 1812, including inflation and
unfunded debt, gave Congress and President James Madison second
thoughts about the bank.  Congress voted in 1816 to establish a new
national bank, the Second Bank of the United States.  Girard would
become one of its principal stockholders.  
The new Bank was allowed to control unregulated issuance of
currency by demanding payment in specie for notes issued by state
banks.  Predictable opposition came from state banks as well as farm-
ers and others in favor of expansionist monetary policy.  The state of
Maryland was persuaded by its banks to tax all banks not chartered by
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the State.  When the Bank challenged the tax, Maryland argued that the
Bank was unconstitutional.  The case went to the Supreme Court where
Daniel Webster argued on behalf of the Bank.  The Supreme Court, in
McCulloch v. Maryland,43 an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall,
held that creating the Bank was an exercise of legitimate fiscal powers
by Congress.
This holding, however, was not free of the tinge of bias.  Chief
Justice Marshall had not fully divested his own stock in the Bank, and
had instead transferred the stock to family members before deciding the
case in 1819.  Chief Justice Marshall's flimsy effort to minimize the
appearance of conflict without fully divesting his Bank stock, fueled the
fire of controversy surrounding both Chief Justice Marshall's Supreme
Court and the history of the Bank.44
In the financial crisis of 1819, the Bank reigned in available
credit, and received part of the blame - at least in the press - for the eco-
nomic hardship that followed.  
In 1823, Nicholas Biddle, of a prominent Philadelphia family,
became President of the Bank, making it even more vulnerable to attack
by populists.  Biddle launched an aggressive publicity campaign on
behalf of the Bank, allegedly paying newspaper editors Mordecai
Manuel Noah and James Watson Webb, among others, to be advocates
for the Bank.  He also caused the Bank to grant low interest loans and
consulting contracts to Members of Congress who would support the
Bank.   As Judge John Noonan recounts in his book on the history of
bribes, Nicholas Biddle kept a handwritten list of "congressmen, feder-
al officials and newspaper editors, liable to the Bank as borrowers or
guarantors" including "James Monroe, down for $10,596; Henry Clay
in the amount of $7,500 and Daniel Webster liable for $17,782".45
Corruption thus again gave ammunition to the Bank's political
43 17 US 316 (1819).
44 This issue apparently did not come up until later, in 1837, when Senator William
Smith of South Carolina alleged that Chief Justice Marshall had decided the case
without fully divesting.  See John T. Noonan, Jr. and Kenneth I. Winston, The
Responsible Judge at 280-85 (1993).
45 John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribes at 444 (1984). 
opponents, now led by President Andrew Jackson.   The Second Bank,
like the First Bank, had financial ties with members of Congress.  The
Bank also spent substantial sums of money supporting Jackson's oppo-
nents in political races.
Two Senators in particular were strong allies of Nicholas Biddle
and the Bank, Daniel Webster and Henry Clay.  Webster, who was orig-
inally elected to Congress as a Federalist opposed to the War of 1812,
initially also opposed the formation of the Bank.  Gradually, however,
Webster grew closer to the Bank and to Nicholas Biddle.46 Webster
argued several cases for the Bank in addition to McCullough v.
Maryland, including Bank of the United States v. Dandridge and McGill
v. Bank of the United States.  Webster agreed to be on the Board of
directors of the Bank's Boston branch.   Webster was paid for these serv-
ices during his term in the Senate. Webster was thus the Bank's princi-
pal lobbyist and lawyer, at the same time as he was a Senator voting on,
and speaking eloquently on behalf of, the Bank's future.47 In 1833,
when the Bank's charter renewal was before Congress, Senator Webster
wrote Biddle:
"Since I have arrived here, I have had an application
to be concerned, professionally, against the Bank, which
I have declined of course, although I believe my retain-
er has not been renewed, or refreshed, as usual.  If it be
wished that my relation to the Bank should be contin-
ued, it may be well to send me the usual retainers." 
The implication was clear - if the retainers were not sent, the
Bank might lose far more than Webster's services as an attorney at law.48
Henry Clay had his own ties to the Bank.  He left Congress for
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46 Webster constantly had financial difficulties.  Professor Gordon aptly described
the ethical fall of Webster in his review of Webster's papers. See Robert Gordon,
The Devil and Daniel Webster, 94 Yale L J 445 (1984).
47 See Charles M. Wiltse and Harold D. Moser, eds.,  2 The Papers of Daniel
Webster (1989) (correspondence with Biddle).   
48 Noonan, Bribes at 444 (cited in note 45) (quoting this correspondence).  
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two years in 1821, after incurring substantial personal debt, and served
as general counsel of the Bank from 1820 to 1825.  In 1823, he again
became a Member of Congress and was elected Speaker.49 In Osborn
v. United States, Clay and Daniel Webster argued on behalf of the Bank
challenging the constitutionality of a tax that Ohio levied upon the
Bank.50
The Bank's charter came up for renewal in 1836, but Biddle and
his allies in Congress decided to force the issue four years earlier in
1832, when President Jackson was up for reelection and was running
against Henry Clay.  The Bank was to become a key issue in the
Presidential election and Daniel Webster spoke strongly in favor of the
Bank in his speech on the Senate floor.  Apparently there was no men-
tion by him of his ties to the Bank.  Congress passed a bill renewing the
Bank's charter.  Jackson vetoed the bill. 
In his veto message of July 10, 1832 Jackson pointed out his
numerous objections:  That the Bank enjoyed a monopoly on the
Federal Government's banking; that one fourth of its stock was held by
foreigners and the rest by a few hundred of the richest Americans; that
these relatively few very wealthy private stockholders would elect 20 of
the Bank's 25 directors, while the government chose only five directors,
virtually assuring that incumbent management could remain in office
and concentrating power in the hands of a few men "irresponsible to the
people"; that the Bank was a threat to democratic government because
any public functionary who sought to curtail its powers "would be made
to feel its influence"; that the Supreme Court was wrong in deciding that
the Bank was constitutional and that Congress and the Executive branch
had a responsibility to decide this for themselves; and that "the rich and
powerful too often bend the Acts of government to their selfish purpos-
49 See Maurice Baxter, Henry Clay and the American System (1995).  See also, The
Henry Clay Family, a Register of Its Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division (2000) (containing correspondence between Clay and Biddle about the
Bank).
50 34 US 573 (1824).  Clay sought to force Ohio's auditor to return improperly
seized taxes to the Bank.  The Supreme Court sided with the Bank and ordered the
auditor to return the money.
es" and it is wrong for the law to bestow "gratuities and exclusive priv-
ileges" on the rich, of which the Act for renewal of the Bank's charter
was an example.51
The President's veto message did not reference specific exam-
ples of the Bank's corruption of Democratic process, but his condem-
nation of the corrupting influence of the Bank on government was clear.
The bank was not just an economic threat, but a threat to democracy
itself, and it had to go.
Senator Webster gave a point-by-point rebuttal of the
President's veto message.  The President, he said, had usurped the
Supreme Court's role in passing on the Constitutionality of the Bank.
Webster also argued that the Bank was chartered by Congress to serve
the public interest, not simply in order to further private gain:
"Congress passed the bill, not as a bounty or a favor to the present
stockholders, not to comply with any demand of right on their part, but
to promote great public interest, for great public objects."52 This argu-
ment would have been more convincing if Webster himself had not had
extensive financial dealings with the Bank.
Jackson appeared to have the moral high ground.  Jackson won
his battle largely because his political power overshadowed that of the
patrician Nicholas Biddle.  The Bank's corruption of Congress also
helped give Jackson the moral upper hand.  Webster may have been
right that the Bank was in the public interest, but his characterization of
Congressional motives was disingenuous when he himself, being both
a Senator and a lawyer on retainer for the Bank, served public and pri-
vate interests simultaneously. 
After his 1832 reelection, Jackson undermined the Bank further,
leading to its early demise.  He redirected federal deposits from the
Bank to state banks.  He then demonstrated his hostility to all banks, and
to paper money in general.   Jackson's July 11, 1836 Specie Circular
required the government to accept only gold and silver in payment for
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51 James D. Richardson, ed., 2  A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 1789-1908 at 576 (Government Printing Office, Washington, DC,
1908).
52 8 Reg  Deb 1221 (Reply of Senator Daniel Webster, dated July 11, 1832).
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sale of federal land.  In 1837, immediately after the election of Jackson's
successor Martin Van Buren, the country went into a financial crisis and
deep depression, arguably because of Jackson's banking policies.   
Allowing the Bank's charter to expire may have been a mistake
for years to come.  In 1907, for example, the absence of a central bank
meant there was no lender of last resort to banks that got into trouble
acting as underwriters and investors in securities markets.  A credit
crunch in the Spring of 1907 was triggered in part by financing
demands abroad for the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars.  In March, the
stock market fell precipitously.   In October, a run on the Knickerbocker
Trust Co. of New York caused the bank to close.  Other banks failed.
J.P. Morgan - like Stephen Girard in 1812 -- had to function much like
a national bank, putting together a consortium of Wall Street financiers
to bail the Country out of crisis.  Morgan's consortium coordinated with
the Treasury Department to rescue other banks, and Treasury provided
them with about $30 million for this purpose.  Morgan also provided
funds for the New York Stock Exchange.53 Morgan was rumored to
have detained other New York bankers in a room where he would not
let them out until they reached agreement on the bailout terms.  He
essentially acted as a national bank in the crisis.
The United States did not have a national bank again until the
Federal Reserve was established in 1913, over two centuries after the
founding of the Bank of England in 1694.
The Second Bank of the United States, like its predecessor,
however, was partly to blame for its own failure.  The Bank's actions
reinforced Jackson's argument that having a national bank corrupted the
political system.  Webster, and the Bank's other supporters in Congress,
by participating in the corruption or tolerating it, also shared in the
blame.
III.   Modern Parallels
In the beginning of this lecture, I mentioned the accounting
53 See Jean Strouse, Morgan: American Financier (1999).
scandals of the 1990s.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act goes well beyond dis-
closure, the traditional subject matter of federal securities regulation,
and deep into corporate governance.  The auditing industry is now sub-
ject to extensive federal regulation.  Some have argued that these
restrictions make the United States less, rather than more, competitive
in the global market for capital.   Could this be our version of the Bubble
Act?54 
Looking beyond our borders, we also see examples of how cor-
ruption of government by business is not just bad for government.   In
the long run, it is bad for business.  Russia's experiment with free mar-
ket capitalism in the 1990's was fraught with corruption of both busi-
ness and government - mostly by Russians, but even some American
economic advisors invested in Russian securities despite a promise to
the United States government that they would avoid conflicts of inter-
est.55 Russia has responded in a typically Russian way - reassertion of
absolute authority over both the economy and the political system by a
central government.56 Parts of Latin America appear to be going in a
similar direction.57
Non Governmental Organizations such as Transparency
International have made fighting corruption globally a top priority.   For
the reasons I have discussed today, historical and contemporary evi-
dence suggest that business interests ought to support these efforts vig-
orously.
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54 See Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous L Rev 77 (cited in note 15).
55 See United States v President and Fellows of Harvard College, Civil Action No.
00CV 11977DPW at 2 (September 26, 2000) (settled in 2005 with payments by
defendants totaling over $31 million) ("The United States alleges that Defendants'
actions undercut the fundamental purpose of the United States program in Russia -
the creation of trust and confidence in the emerging Russian financial markets and
the promotion of openness, transparency, the rule of law, and fair play in the devel-
opment of the Russian economy and laws.").
56 See Marshall Goldman, The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry
(2003).




Here in the United States, there is a lot of regulation aimed at
corruption in government and business, and perhaps more soon to
come.   The nagging question is whether we fight corruption simply by
adding another layer of regulation every time a scandal breaks, particu-
larly if politicians are caught up in it.
After Watergate, federal ethics rules became complex in many
areas including financial disclosure, financial conflicts of interest,
employment relationships, negotiating for employment in the private
sector, and so forth.  Criminal and civil statutes apply, as well as rules
promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics.  
The ethics office that I supervise in the White House works with
every Presidential nominee to a Senate confirmed position in the
Executive Branch to assure that these rules will be complied with.  Each
Executive Branch agency has its own ethics office, headed up by its
own Designated Ethics Officer.  The amount of paper work is extensive.
The press and public, however, perceive that gaps remain.  The
lobbying industry has grown substantially in recent years, although lob-
byists have for a long time been a fixture in Washington - the word
came from the lobby of the Willard Hotel, near the White House, where
influence peddlers would wait for members of President Grant's admin-
istration to come over to drink and smoke cigars.  The lobbying indus-
try is not regulated the same way as the legal profession.  Disclosure of
lobbying contacts is the regulatory norm for lobbyists, and substantive
standards of conduct are relatively lax, whereas substantive standards of
conduct are the norm for lawyers.  More disclosure by lobbyists may
help, but will it be sufficient?
Finally, the high cost of election campaigns enhances an avenue
of influence that Nicholas Biddle experimented with when he funded
the campaigns of President Jackson's political opponents.  A senator
today cannot represent private banks on the side, and collect a "retain-
er", as Senator Webster did from the Bank of the United States, but a
senator can receive campaign contributions from banks.  First
Amendment concerns make the campaign finance avenue of influence
far more difficult to constrain than the other methods that Biddle used
to influence Webster and his colleagues.  Full disclosure of campaign
contributions may be the only practical approach.  How we will deal
with this and other contemporary challenges to the integrity of govern-
ment and business has yet to be determined.
30 qÜÉj~ìêáÅÉ~åÇjìêáÉäcìäíçåiÉÅíìêÉpÉêáÉë
